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Nous nous intéressons dans ce document au problème tenace de la mesure de
l’iniquité horizontale. Nous proposons tout d’abord une mesure locale d’iniquité
horizontale, que nous agrégeons ensuite en un indice global. À la différence d’autres
approches, qui s’intéressent au gain en bien-être social qu’il y aurait à éliminer
l’iniquité horizontale en gardant constant le revenu de l’État, notre indice global
mesure le gain fiscal per capita qui échoirait au gouvernement si l’iniquité
horizontale était éliminée sans changement dans le niveau de bien-être social.
Lorsque ce gain fiscal est exprimé en proportion des revenus moyens nets, notre
mesure constitue un élément (négatif) dans l’indice de progressivité de Blackorby et
Donaldson (1984); elle quantifie alors la perte de performance verticale causée par
un traitement fiscal discriminatoire vis-à-vis d’individus qui étaient égaux avant
l’intervention de l’État. Notre indice étant exprimé en unités monétaires, son
interprétation est facile et intuitive. Nous proposons finalement des procédures
d’estimationnon-paramétriquepourrésoudreleproblèmeimportantdel’identification
des individus égaux dans une distribution de bien-être. À notre connaissance, il s’agit
d’ailleurs de la première solution statistiquement cohérente au problème classique de
la mesure de l’iniquité horizontale. La méthode est appliquée à la distribution
canadienne des revenus bruts et nets en 1981 et 1990.
Abstract
This paper makes a new attack on the old problem of measuring horizontal
inequity (HI). A local measure of HI is proposed, and aggregated into a global index.
Whilst other approaches have captured the welfare gain which would come from
eliminating HI revenue-neutrally, our global index provides a measure of the revenue
gain per capita which would come from eliminating HI welfare-neutrally. When
expressed as a fraction of mean post-tax income, the measure can be viewed as a
negative component in the Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) index of tax
progressivity, quantifying the loss of vertical performance arising from differences
in the tax treatment of equals. Being money-metric, the measure can also be easily
and intuitively interpreted. We propose non-parametric estimation procedures to
obviate the important identification of equals problem. To our knowledge, this
provides the first consistent statistical solution to measuring classical horizontal
inequity. The method is applied to the Canadian distributions of gross and net
incomes in 1981 and 1990.1. Introduction
Horizontal equity (HE) demands that like individuals be treated alike, whilst
vertical equity is a command to differentiate appropriately among unlike individuals.
These principles can be extended to households and families. Violations of HE can
arise, for instance, from the many tax breaks granted for charitable giving, mortgage
interest, capital gains, dividends, political contributions or retirement savings, or due
to tax evasion, incomplete benefit take-up, arbitrariness in the allocation of state
benefits, or differentiation in indirect tax rates
1. In general, indeed, it can be argued
that any form of government intervention which impacts on relative prices in a world
of heterogeneous individual consumption and investment preferences will lead to
violations of horizontal equity.
In this paper, we outline a new procedure for measuring the extent of
horizontal inequity (HI) and for decomposing the distributional impact of the income
tax
2 into vertical and horizontal components. The starting point for our procedure is
a local HI measure capturing the dispersion of post-tax welfare among pre-tax equals.
Specifically, we adopt the ’cost-of-inequality’ approach which has been described by
Kay and King (1984).
3 When the local measure is aggregated into a global index,
using a weighting scheme which ensures that the importance attributed to a local
inequity does not depend upon the welfare level at which it is experienced, a global
index results which, we show, measures the revenue gain per capita that would come
from eliminating HI with no loss of social welfare in any equals group.
1 For such instances, see, e.g., Gravelle (1992), Bishop et al. (1994) and Duclos
(1995b).
2 Our methodology allows for negative income taxes, that is, for the presence of
transfers. Our illustration below indeed features a number of state benefits as well as
a positive income tax.
3 "How much commission would we pay Robin Hood to transfer £1 from the rich
to the poor? The answer will depend on our view of inequality .. we can imagine a
continuing series of such transfers which eventually bring us to a wholly egalitarian
outcome and measure the amount of income which we would be willing to give up
in order to bring about this result. This total amount is the "cost of inequality": the
reduction in aggregate income which we would accept in order to achieve complete
equality in its distribution .. the size of these costs depends on how much we are
offended by inequality" (p. 221).As we explain, other recent approaches based on the local-to-global
aggregation procedure, those of Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos
(1996), have an opposite but symmetrical property: they capture the overall welfare
gain that would come from eliminating HI revenue-neutrally within every equals
group.
The new HI index enjoys a close connection with the Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984) index of progressivity in the tax system. This index, we show,
decomposes into two components. One, being positive, measures the distributional
characteristic of the hypothetical (or reference) tax system in which the local
inequities have been eliminated as described above; the other, negative, is our HI
index measured as a fraction of mean post-tax income. By means of this
decomposition, the analyst can describe the progressivity of the tax system in terms
of vertical and horizontal contributions, and for different assumed values of the
inequality aversion parameter.
We propose a non-parametric estimation procedure to assess the distribution
of horizontal inequities. This allows us to solve statistically the important normative
identification of equals' problem, according to which few exact equals can be found
in small samples (and none from a continuous population distribution of welfare).
The procedure is applied to the Canadian distribution of gross and net incomes in
1981 and in 1990.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we lay out briefly the
necessary prerequisites for the analytical framework we shall adopt. In Section 3, the
measurement system is specified and the theoretical results already indicated are
made explicit and proven. In Section 4, we discuss implementation difficulties and
also statistical and modelling issues. Section 5 contains the application to the
Canadian income distribution for 1981 and 1990, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The analytical framework
Let x be income, not necessarily denominated in standard monetary terms;
for example, it could be equivalized income, and could also encompass various forms
of imputable income and non-market sources of utility and disutility. Let x be the
income distribution vector and W(x) a homothetic social evaluation function, for
2which the equally distributed equivalent (henceforth EDE) income is x:W ( x 1 )=
W(x). For the empirical application to follow, W(x) will be average utility, where
Ue(x) is the utility-of-income function which displays constant relative inequality
aversion with parameter e:
Ue( x )=x
1-e/(1-e) if 0 < e ¹ 1, U 1(x) = n x (1)
In this case, Ue(x) measures average utility across x and x is a generalized mean of
x. Whatever the evaluation function, the cost of inequality in x is, in per capita
terms:
C=µ-x (2)
where µ is the mean of x. The Atkinson (1970) index of inequality for x is:
I ( e )=C / µ=1-x /µ (3)
Now suppose that x
b and x
a are distributions of income before and after
application of an income tax, with Atkinson indices I
b and I
a respectively. The
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) index of progressivity may be defined in terms of






If we defined an index of equality as 1-I, P would measure the percentage change
in equality generated by the move from the pre-tax to the post-tax income







Here, g is the rate of a proportional (henceforth flat) tax raising the same revenue as
the actual tax system, whilst, by the linear homogeneity of x, g is the rate of a flat
3tax for which post-tax welfare is the same as after the actual tax.
4 Substituting in (4)
from (3) and (5), we have:
P =[ g-g ]/[ 1-g ] ( 6 )
Let C
a and C
f be the cost-of-inequality measures for the distributions of income x
a
after the actual tax and x
f = (1-g)x














That is, P measures the percentage of after-tax income that a social decision-maker
(SDM) with inequality aversion e would pay to convert a flat tax system with the
same after-tax welfare into the actual one.
5 Or, said differently, P measures the
additional percentage of post-tax income which the actual tax system yields to the
tax authority as compared to the yield of a proportional tax system, with identical
social welfare from both tax systems.
3. The measurement system
The equals or like individuals in the HE command are, according to Feldstein
(1976), those with the same utility. The injunction to treat like individuals alike has
4 Duclos (1995a) defines a performance index t for the tax system, which
captures the distinction between g and g. Specifically, t is the proportional surcharge
on post-tax incomes x
a which would reduce post-tax welfare to that after revenue-
neutral flat tax: (1-t)x
a = (1-g)x
b. It follows from (5) that (1-t) = (1-g) / (1-g).
5 The social decision maker would clearly pay a positive amount if the actual tax
system is progressive (inequality-reducing): the more progressive, the more he would
pay. It is also the case that the more inequality-averse he is, the more he would pay.
Duclos (1995a,1996) demonstrates this, in respect of his performance index t, which
is related to P by P = t/(1-t) : compare (6) with the formula in the previous
footnote.
4also been extended to households and families.
6 The first step for our analysis is to
turn the business of identifying the equals into a unidimensional problem. We shall
require income units’ pre-tax incomes, or living standards, x
b, to be measured on a
scale which identifies the equals: equals will be those having the same pre-tax
income x
b.
For all that is to follow, we assume that an appropriate scale has been
devised
7. The income unit may be the individual, the family, the household or the
equivalent adult. For convenience we refer to an income unit as a person henceforth.
The starting point for empirical analysis is a pair of vectors x = x
b and x
a
representing the pre- and post-tax distributions. If a scatterplot is drawn, these
typically evidence an unsystematic relationship. See Figure 1, which depicts a sample
of Canadian individuals for the year 1990.
8 HI occurs when points on this
scattergraph are vertically aligned: this depicts well the situation in which pre-tax
equals have different post-tax incomes.
Let Wx denote the group of persons having exactly x before tax: this is the
’equals group’ located at point x. Locally, we seek to capture as HI the magnitude
of unequal tax treatment among these people. We may thus think of local HI as
inequality introduced by the tax system where there was none before - that is, within
each Wx. We use the cost-of-inequality approach, requiring the input of a specified
degree of inequality aversion e on the part of an SDM as described in Section 2.
6 See Manser (1979, p. 224), Habib (1979, p. 286) and Steuerle (1983, p. 81).
7 Money income would serve for x if the population under investigation consisted
of people with identical tastes, needs and abilities. Manser (1979) discusses the
modelling of household objectives including different leisure times of their members,
and Rosen (1976) demonstrates an empirical procedure which, given rich enough
microdata, will "generate two vectors, one of family utilities before tax and one of
family utilities after tax", and he goes on to say that "the real problem in measuring
horizontal equity is to summarize the differences between these vectors in a
meaningful way" (p. 314). Steuerle (1983) advocates equivalization as the means to
provide "a working definition of equity" across family sizes. Jenkins (1988) argues
against equivalizing, seeing the business of identifying the equals as an essentially
multidimensional issue, and adopts instead a partial approach in which he refrains
from making identifications across distinct socioeconomic subpopulations, capturing
HI within each in terms of rank changes induced by the tax.




b be the mean and EDE income levels overall before tax,
and let µ
a and x












of post-tax income per capita within Wx to have that group’s HE violations removed
with no loss of welfare. This is our measure of local HI at x.
The next step is to aggregate the Hx ,x Î R , into a global index, call it H,
using a weighting scheme. There are plenty of possibilities; we choose to use
population shares as weights. Thus:
H=S xp x.H x (10)
where px is the proportion of the overall population who are located at point x on the
pre-tax income scale: px = Nx / N, where Nx =| W x| and N = Sx Nx.This construction
ensures that the importance attributed to a local HE violation does not depend upon
the income level at which it is experienced. That is, H is not polluted with vertical
considerations, heeding Musgrave’s (1990) warning to avoid "inappropriate
comparisons between unequals" (pp. 117-8) in constructing a global HI index.
9 There





x " x (11)
as the tax people would pay to remove HI with no loss of social welfare in Wx,w e
may call Twn(•) the welfare-neutral HE replacement tax. Our first result shows that
overall HI, as defined in (10), may be interpreted as the additional tax revenue per
capita that would flow from replacing the actual tax system by this welfare-neutral
replacement schedule:
9 Global indices of HI proposed by Habib (1979), Berliant and Strauss (1985) and
Aronson et al. (1994) use explicitly income-dependent weights for local inequities.
For more on the last of these, see on.
6Theorem 1
H measures the per capita gain in revenue that would come from substituting
the tax system by Twn(•).
Proof : This follows directly from the choice of weighting scheme. The
income saving which would come from eliminating post-tax inequality with social
indifference in Wx is Hx, and therefore the income saving overall, or additional tax
revenue generated, is SxNx.H x/N=S xp x.H x=H . Q.E.D.
Of course there would be winners and losers from this hypothetical process
of HI elimination. It is not a policy recommendation of this paper that we should
identify and substitute Twn(•) for the actual tax system; Twn(•) serves as the yardstick
against which the social cost of the HE violations in actual taxes can be assessed. An
attractive feature of our index H is that it sets a dollar value upon HI, conditioned
by the assumed inequality aversion e of the SDM: as e is increased, the SDM
becomes willing to pay more to eliminate unequal tax treatment of equals, and
measured HI therefore increases.
The locus of points (x,µ
a
x) as x varies traces out the pre-tax/post-tax income
relationship which would obtain if tax payments were averaged at each pe-tax income
level x. The schedule Trn(•), defined by:
Trn( x )=x- µ
a
x (12)
would collect the same revenue as the actual tax system from each equals group: we
call it the revenue-neutral HE replacement tax. Such averaging out produces a
welfare gain for the membership of Wx as well as an inequality reduction (Atkinson,
1970). Hence, comparing the two HE replacement tax schedules Trn(•) and Twn(•), the
one delivers a better welfare performance than the actual system and the same
revenue, whilst the other delivers the same welfare and more revenue.
10 Both
schedules are illustrated for Canada in 1990 in Section 5 ahead. We then have that:
Hx =T wn( x )-T rn(x)
10 The global HI indices of Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos (1996)
capture the welfare gain from replacing the tax system by Trn(•), to accord with
Musgrave’s (1990) view that: "applied to any one group of equals, HE performance
is measured .... over what it would have been with equal division of liability within
the group" (p.117).
7Our global HI index H can be interpreted as a loss of performance, where we
measure the performance of an income tax relative to equal-welfare flat taxes.
11
Recall from Section 2 that g is the rate of the equal-welfare flat tax, and that C
a and
C
f, as defined in (7), measure the income savings that would arise if all inequality




b after application of the actual tax and the flat one respectively. Define as C
*







measure the performance of the actual tax system and of Twn(•) respectively in
reducing inequality: they are the amounts per capita which an SDM with inequality
aversion e would pay to convert the flat (inequality-neutral) tax into the actual one
and into Twn(•) respectively. The result which secures the interpretation of H as a
performance loss is this:
Theorem 2
P=P wn -H
Proof : If all inequality of post-tax income were to be eliminated with social
indifference, by moving from x
a to the distribution in which everybody got x
a, the
income saving per capita would be C
a; whilst if we moved to perfect equality from
the distribution after application of Twn(•), in which people in Wx get x
a
x "x, the
income saving would be C
*. Equating the overall income saving with the sum of






11 In Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos (1996), the performance of
the tax system is measured relative to equal-revenue flat taxes - that is, by
redistributive effect.
12 (14) is readily validated in formal terms as follows: use the formulae for C
a




* = Sxpx. x
a
x is the mean after
application of Twn(•); and use µ
a = Sxpx.µ
a
x. This is a particular case of the general
between-and-within-groups decomposition due to Blackorby et al. (1981).
8The after-tax cost of inequality is therefore the cost of inequality after an horizontally
equitable tax plus the cost of HI. The result of Theorem 2 follows by subtracting
each side of (14) from C
f. Q.E.D.
It is both natural and convenient to measure the cost of HI as a fraction of
the total income in the post-tax distribution.




which is, of course, unit-free and between 0 and 1.
14 In fact, H1 is a weighted sum




where qx is the post-tax income share of the people in Wx.
15 The weighting scheme
here is non-pure: to measure local HI as inequality I
a
x rather than cost of inequality
Hx means, for example, that a 1% deviation of post-tax incomes around their mean
in a ’richer’ equals group counts more towards global HI than the comparable
dispersion in a poorer one.
16
The decomposition of Theorem 2 can be modified, to make H1 into a measure
of performance loss. For this, performance is measured not by P and Pwn but by the
corresponding Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) indices of tax progressivity:
Theorem 3
Let P and Pwn be the Blackorby-Donaldson progressivity indices for the
actual tax system and for Twn(•) respectively. Then:
P = q.Pwn -H 1
13 David Donaldson suggested this approach, which is motivated by the work of
Blewitt (1982).
14 In the absence of HI, H1 = 0. If a very large number of people all had the
same pre-tax income, and one of them got all of the post-tax income, then H1 ® 1.









x =p x H x
/µ
a. Now use (10).
16 The Gini-based global HI index of Aronson et al. (1994) has a similar




x is the Gini coefficient of post-
tax income in the equals group Wx. Lambert and Ramos’s (1996) index, based on the
mean logarithmic deviation, has pure weights.




Proof : Divide by µ
a in the result of Theorem 2, noting that P =P/µ
afrom
(8) and Pwn =P wn /µ







x which is less than 1 because the EDE income x
a
x is less than the mean
µ
a
x , "x. Q.E.D.
Because everything is expressed at constant welfare, there is a size effect in
eliminating HI; this is why the value q appears in the decomposition.
4. Implementation: statistical and modelling issues
If, as will generally be the case, one’s sample micro-data is drawn from an
(approximately) continuous joint population distribution of individual incomes x
a and
x
b, the sample probability of observing exact equals is virtually zero. This is the
’identification of equals’ problem which led in the late 1970s to the emergence of the
’reranking’ approach to measuring HI.
17 However, using recent statistical advances,
we can estimate non-parametrically and consistently the continuous population
distribution of x
a and x
b using the empirical joint distribution of the two variables,
and integrate over that estimated distribution to yield consistent estimates of the HI
indices (H and H1) and performance indices (P, Pwn, P and Pwn).
To be more precise, a consistent estimator f
^
xa x of the conditional density
function for x









xa x. From the definition of the EDE income for equals















17 On the reranking approach, see, for instance, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson
(1979), Plotnick (1982) and Duclos (1993). For a criticism of that approach, see
Kaplow (1989) and Musgrave (1990). For a comparison of the reranking and classical
approaches using simulation, see Lambert and Ramos (1997).

























xa x is continuous over x, these estimators will also be continous across x.
Integrating H
^






ˆ Hx ˆ f(x) d(x)
where f
^(x) is the estimator of the implied marginal density function for pre-tax
income. Alternatively, if income x is estimated to be at percentile p, so that
p=ò0
xf










In the application to follow, we use the non-parametric kernel estimation
procedure, with Gaussian kernel and bandwith chosen to minimise the mean
integrated square error in measuring the shape of a wide range of possible population
densities.
18 The estimated distribution tends asymptotically to the true one if the
latter is continuous.
19
This approach enables us to ’reconstruct’ indices of local HI, of the cost of
inequality and of EDE income as functions of pre-tax income x. This is a statistically
preferable procedure to the use of discrete banding into ’close equals groups’, which
18 See Silverman (1986), p.48. Another approach would be to choose the
bandwidth parameter to minimise the square error in measuring H. This is left to
future investigation.
19 See Silverman (1986), pp.71-72.
11has been the practice in some previous literature on the measurement of classical
HI.
20 The kernel method replaces the arbitrariness of the close equals groupings by
kernel bandwidths possessing known statistical properties, and provides smooth
estimates with automatic convergence to the true population values under weak
regularity conditions.
5. Canada, 1981 and 1990
The Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances provides sample micro-data
annually on pre-tax and pre-benefit family incomes, provincial and federal personal
income taxes and cash transfers received from the provincial and federal
governments.
21 The 1981 and 1990 data sets comprise respectively 38,000 and
45,000 observations. To adjust these data for heterogeneity in the size and the
composition of families, we equivalised using the OECD equivalence scale. We also
removed families reporting negative gross or net incomes.
The kernel estimate of the joint density function for gross and net equivalent
incomes is shown in Figure 2.
22 If there were no HI in the tax and transfer system,
this joint density would be positive only above a single line, showing a deterministic
relationship between gross and net income. The flatter the conditional density of net
income (given a level of gross income), the greater the HI at that gross income level.
Alternatively, the more unequal are net incomes conditional on a particular level of
gross income, the more HI there is.
23
20 Berliant and Strauss (1985) and Lambert and Ramos (1996) do this explicitly.
Such an approach could also be devised for the indices and decompositions
expounded in this paper: see Lambert (1995).
21 Income includes wages and salaries, self-employment income, private pensions
and investment income. Transfers include Federal and Québec family and youth
allowances, Child Tax Credits, Old Age Security Pensions and Guaranteed Income
Supplement, Canada/Québec Pension Plan Benefits, Unemployment Insurance
Benefits, Social Assistance Benefits and provincial income supplements, various tax
credits and grants to individuals, veterans’ pensions, pensions to widows, and
workers’ compensation.
22 For expositional convenience, we have normalized gross and net incomes by
their means for Figure 1 and all subsequent Figures and Tables.
23 This suggests that a test of ’conditional HE dominance’ of one joint
distribution over another might be constructed, in a manner analogous to the well-
known tests of Lorenz dominance for the measurement of inequality. We have
12In Figure 3, some features of the joint distribution of gross and net income
are shown for Canada in 1990. For each centile point in the distribution of gross
income, the unbroken line shows the value of gross income x (normalized by the
mean), the dotted line shows the predicted value µ
a
x of net income (also normalized),
and the dots show the sample values of net income (these dots form a subsample of
the dots in Figure 1). The estimated mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) of net
income at each centile point is also shown (scale on the left vertical axis).
24 The
difference between the lines of gross income and predicted net income shows the
vertical impact of the tax and benefit system: relative to a system of tax and benefit
allocation that would be proportional to gross income, the poor benefit and the rich
lose. The MLD decreases over most of its range, which indicates that the conditional
inequality of net income is greater the lower is gross income. This is not unexpected,
since benefits affect largely those at the bottom end of the distribution. The
dispersion of the dots indicates a significant degree of income reranking in the tax
and benefit allocation.
To indicate the cost of HI at different gross income levels, we display in
Figure 4 the levels of revenue-neutral taxation, Trn(x), and the differences,
Hx =T wn(x)-Trn(x), betweenwelfare-neutral andrevenue-neutral taxation (scaleon the
right vertical axis) for 1990 Canada. The size of Trn(x) in Figure 4 corresponds to the
distance between predicted net incomes µ
a
x and gross incomes in Figure 3. Trn(x) is
negative for values of x up to about 80% of per capita mean gross income, and varies
in size from -45% to 100% of it. Twn(x)-Trn(x) is positive everywhere, ranging
between 5% and 0.5% of per capita gross income for e=0.75 and between 1.2% and
0.2% for e=0.25. This excess of welfare-neutral over revenue-neutral tax is larger at
lower values of gross income and is higher for a greater degree of inequality aversion
(recall footnote 4). At average gross income, for instance, we could replace the actual
tax system by an horizontally equitable one with the same welfare but which would
yield an additional revenue to the government of the order of 0.8% of per capita
income (for e=0.75; 0.3% for e=0.25).
earmarked this as a topic for future research.
24 The MLD for a distribution with density function f(x) and mean µ is ò(lnµ-
lnx)f(x)dx.
13Figure 5 displays the cost of HI, H(p), at different centiles in the Canadian
income distribution in 1981 and 1990, for e=0.25 and e=0.75. The figure also shows
the Atkinson index of inequality for 1990 at e=0.75 (scale on right vertical axis).
When multiplied by µ
a
x, this index yields the cost of HI. Hence, the greater the value
of µ
a
x, the greater the HI cost associated with a given degree of (conditional) net
income inequality; this accounts for the growing gap between the inequality
(continuous line) and cost of HI (dotted line) as centiles and µ
a
x both increase (1990,
e=0.75). HI for 1990 is generally greater than for 1981, except in the bottom and top
percentiles, for both values of e.
The areas under the curves H(p) for 1981 and 1990 give the overall money-
metric costs of HI (recall (21)). These values are shown in Table 1 as percentages
of per capita income (i.e. as the index H1 of equation (15)). Table 1 also shows the
cost C
f of inequality after the welfare-equivalent flat tax (at rate g), the excess tax
revenue which the actual tax system generates in comparison to this flat tax as a
fraction of the mean (i.e. (g-g)/(1-g), which from (6) measures the performance of the
tax system), the cost C
a of after-tax inequality, and the cost C
* of inequality of
income net of the horizontally equitable tax Twn(x) (all measured relative to mean
post-tax income). As fractions of mean post-tax income, C
f in 1990 is significantly
greater than in 1981, and C
a is conversely less in 1990 than in 1981. Hence, the
performance of the tax and transfer system is significantly better in 1990 than in
1981, by (4.66-3.45=) 1.21% of per capita income for e=0.25 and by 5.74% of per
capita income for e=0.75. Had the actual tax and transfer system been horizontally
equitable, the cost of after-tax inequality would have been C
* (=C
a -H). Hence, in
the absence of HI in 1981 for e=0.25, the state would have been able to collect 0.4%
more of per capita income in taxes with no adverse effect on social welfare. This
goes up to 1.61% of per capita income for e=0.75 and for 1990.
In Table 2, the net performance P of the tax and transfer system is
decomposed in terms of the Blackorby and Donaldson progressivity index Pwn for
the horizontally equitable tax Twn(x) and the aggregate index of horizontal inequity
H1, as in Theorem 3. The first column shows that compared to flat tax, the actual
system generates between 3.45% and 28.49% more of per capita income in revenue.
The second column indicates that the average income after application of Twn(x)
would be between 99.6% and 98.39% of the actual post-tax mean. The third and
fourth columns display the Blackorby-Donaldson tax progressivity index and
performance contribution of Twn(x). The difference is accounted for by HI. For
14e=0.25, HI decreases the overall performance of the tax system by about 10% (and
by around 0.4% of per capita income); for e=0.75, performance is reduced by about
5% (and by 1.3% to 1.6% of per capita income).
Table 3 summarises these results and compares them with those obtained
following the approach advocated by Lambert and Ramos (1996), which uses the
MLD. Both approaches agree that overall redistribution and vertical equity are greater
in 1990 than in 1981. The cost-of-inequality approach indicates that HI is greater in
1990 than in 1981, but the MLD approach suggests the converse, although by a small
(and probably statistically insignificant) margin. By both the MLD and the e=0.25
decompositions, HI represents a loss of about 10% of the vertical equity exerted by
the tax and transfer system.
An alternative and final decomposition is shown in Table 4 using a change-
in-inequality approach. This approach is often encountered in applied work when
assessing by how much inequality is affected by the tax and transfer system. The
overall redistributive change in inequality, I
b-I
a, equals the change in inequality





the level of HI (inequality) introduced by the system. The tax and transfer system is
again found to be significantly more redistributive in 1990 than in 1981, for both
e=0.25 and e=0.75, and net redistribution is about 10% lower than it would have
been in the absence of HI.
6. Overview and conclusion
There is a need among tax policymakers, as well as tax designers and
administrators, for meaningful summary indicators of HI to guide the process of
reform. This paper offers a systematic and normatively sound approach, according
to which HI is measured by the amount an inequality-averse SDM would pay to have
it removed, both in dollars and as a percentage of total income. Being money-metric,
the cost of HI can be compared to the money-metric increase in efficiency which a
government rule or intervention may generate, or to the money-metric fall in the cost
of inequality brought about by the vertical redistribution of a tax and benefit system.
We can then determine ethically if the dollar increase in efficiency (or fall in
inequality) possibly exerted by some government policy is worth the dollar cost of
HI which this policy may cause. The degree of inequality aversion must be specified
by the analyst, and this offers the opportunity to test robustness of conclusions using
15sensitivity analysis - of itself a new development in the HI measurement literature
25.
The methodology also shows that HI can be seen as ’loss of performance’: a new
decomposition of Blackorby and Donaldson’s (1984) index of tax progressivity
demonstrates this.
We have discussed the implementation difficulties arising from the
identification problem, and have proposed statistically attractive procedures to
estimate HI, both locally and globally, and to compare the HI characteristics of
alternative tax and transfer systems
26. Our illustrative application showed that HI
in the Canadian tax and transfer system increased from 1981 to 1990, being
responsible in 1990 for about a ten percent loss of vertical equity.
The methodology has wide applicability, both as a means to investigate the
performance and the equity of the tax and transfer system in itself and in
comparisons between countries or levels of government, and over time. We may also
use it to decompose total HI into socio-economic groups and individual taxes and
transfers. Is it socially less costly, in foregone tax dollars, for government to collect
its revenue using a range of taxes, or by engaging a single tax instrument like the
expenditure tax? How socially costly is the HI (and inequality) introduced by private
sector rules and markets (e.g., by gender or racial discrimination)? Our measures can
inform topical questions such as this. Indeed, the technology we have described is
capable of extracting from any scattergram of normatively significant variables, such
as that in Figure 1, a horizontal-vertical characterization of the underlying data
generating process. It may be of interest in biometrics, for example, in characterizing
biodiversity (Polasky and Solow, 1995), as well as in economics.
25 Note that this degree of inequality aversion can very well differ for vertical
and horizontal inequality. For instance, a "minimal state" SDM could be insensitive
to the exercise of vertical equity and to levels of vertical inequality but ethically very
sensitive to violations of horizontal inequity by the state.
26 Future work must nevertheless be undertaken to check the statistical reliability
of our results (possibly using numerical simulation techniques), as well as their
sensitivity to the presence of measurement errors and to the choice of equivalence
scales.
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18Table 1
Cost of Vertical and Horizontal Inequality









e=0.25 1981 7.09 3.45 3.64 3.24 0.40
1990 8.13 4.66 3.47 3.00 0.47
e=0.75 1981 33.82 22.75 11.07 9.78 1.29
1990 39.13 28.49 10.64 9.03 1.61
19Table 2
Tax Performance and Blackorby-Donaldson Indices of Tax Progressivity
(as % of post-tax per capita income)
P/µ
a (= P) q=µ
*/µ
a Pwn Pwn/µ
a (= qPwn) H1
e=0.25 1981 3.45 99.60 3.87 3.85 0.40
1990 4.66 99.53 5.13 5.15 0.47
e=0.75 1981 22.75 98.71 24.35 24.04 1.29
1990 28.49 98.39 30.59 30.10 1.61
20Table 3
Redistribution, Vertical Equity and Horizontal Inequity
Using the Cost of Inequality and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation Decompositions














e=0.25 0.0345 0.0385 0.0040
0.3530 0.3920 0.0391
e=0.75 0.2275 0.2404 0.0129
1990
e=0.25 0.0466 0.0513 0.0047
0.4298 0.4678 0.0380
e=0.75 0.2849 0.3010 0.0161
21Table 4
Redistribution, Vertical Equity and Horizontal Inequity








e=0.25 1981 0.0321 0.0361 0.0040
1990 0.0430 0.0477 0.0047
e=0.75 1981 0.1648 0.1777 0.0129
1990 0.1982 0.2142 0.0161
22Figure 3
Distribution of gross and net incomes 
Canada, 1990
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Cost of horizontal inequity





































































Inequality of 1990 net incomes
e=0.75
Cost of 1990 HI
e=0.25
Cost of 1990 HI
e=0.75
Cost of 1981 HI
e=0.25
Cost of 1981 HI
e=0.75